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Introduction
Armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic 
of the Congo are generally seen as being a rural 
phenomenon, operating mostly in remote forest 
or mountain settings. There is some truth to this 
characterization. Despite occasional attacks on 
cities and operations in urban peripheries, most 
armed group activity takes place in rural zones.1 
However, this does not mean armed groups 
in the eastern Congo are an exclusively rural 
phenomenon. In fact, many of these groups have 
intimate and long-standing connections with urban 
areas. 
Before and during the Congo Wars (1996–2003), 
some armed mobilization in the region was rooted 
in the grievances of rural populations, particularly 
socio-economic marginalization and conflicts 
around land and local authority. The conflicts 
generally had a pronounced identity dimension 
and were intimately bound up with political 
contestation evident at provincial, national and 
regional levels.2  Rural grievances continue to 
shape armed mobilization today, yet the beliefs, 
grievances and interests of the urban backers of 
armed groups have come to play an increasingly 
important role.
This briefing argues that armed groups should 
be seen as part of broader militarized networks 
that span rural and urban areas and may also have 
significant extensions abroad. These networks 
channel flows of ideas, money, people, arms and 
armed practices and are crucial for the mobilization 
of combatants, support and supplies. They bridge 
an ostensible rural-urban divide that has been 
tightened by improved means of transport and 
communication, in particular mobile internet and 
the spread of motorcycle taxis to transport people 
and goods.
Understanding and discouraging armed 
mobilization requires addressing such networks—
across cities, secondary towns, rural areas and 
in the diaspora—as a whole. To this end, it is 
necessary to hold urban-based political actors 
with ties to armed groups to account, and tackle 
their involvement in recruitment, propaganda and 
revenue generation. 
History
Historically, rural populations have played a key 
role in initiating and sustaining rebellion in the 


























protests and revolts in rural areas. For example, 
in 1944, a revolt rocked the rural territories of 
Masisi and Lubutu. It was initiated by a religious 
movement, the Kitawalists, who sought to end 
oppressive and extractive colonial practices.4 
In the post-independence period, after 1960, rural 
protests in the southern part of Kivu Central 
province sparked broader mobilization that 
morphed into the Simba Rebellion.5 However, 
the leadership of the rebellion, which received 
extensive support from revolutionary elites 
across the continent, was primarily composed of 
politicians based in the national and provincial 
capitals, as well as in cities in neighbouring 
countries. As the rebellion evolved beyond 
southern Kivu, urban populations, in particular 
youth, came to play an important role.6 While 
poor urban youth made up most of the rank-and-
file, its political and military leadership featured 
more educated urbanites. Foreshadowing future 
armed mobilization, the Simba Rebellion brought 
together rural and urban recruits, supporters, ideas 
and interests, while its support networks extended 
far beyond the Congo’s borders. 7
During the second half of Mobutu Sese Seko’s 
rule (1965–1997), economic decline and bad 
governance fuelled the pauperization of rural areas. 
As infrastructure crumbled, rural hinterlands 
became disconnected from cities, including urban 
markets. Rural populations also suffered from 
predatory public servants and customary chiefs, 
who imposed arbitrary taxation and forced labour.8 
Land conflicts intensified and became enmeshed 
with long-running disputes around (customary) 
local authority and identity.9 Young men who 
were unable to obtain land of their own, or find 
other employment, and thus could not start their 
own families, became stuck in a liminal societal 
space between adolescence and adulthood. When 
rural militias emerged in the early 1990s, these 
disenfranchised rural youth—motivated to defend 
their communities and achieve political and 
economic transformation—filled their ranks.10
mai	mai	mural	in	baraka,	south	Kivu	©	Christoph	vogel
rEbEls	anD	ThE	CiTy 3 
Another wave of mobilization struck rural areas 
when the insurgency of the Alliance des forces 
démocratiques pour la libération du Congo/Zaïre (AFDL, 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo/Zaire)—backed by Rwanda and other 
African countries—occupied large parts of the east 
in 1996. Distrusting the rebellion’s foreign backers, 
people fought, albeit unsuccessfully, to resist its 
advance towards the capital, Kinshasa, which the 
rebels took after only seven months. Others joined 
the insurgency after receiving accelerated military 
training. 
An even bigger mobilization occurred between 1998 
and 2003 during the rebellion of the Rassemblement 
congolais pour la démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally 
for Democracy), again backed by Rwanda and other 
neighbouring countries. While the RCD controlled 
the main cities as well as most medium-size towns, 
self-defence groups known as Mai-Mai waged a 
guerrilla war across the countryside. Although 
many combatants and commanders hailed from 
rural areas, Mai-Mai groups drew support from 
urban opponents of the RCD. 
As a peace process emerged to end the war 
through a series of power-sharing deals, certain 
urban-based politicians reinvented themselves 
as political representatives of Mai-Mai and other 
armed groups. They thus hoped to tap into the 
political and administrative job opportunities 
opening up during the transitional government.11 
Many representatives, however, turned out to be 
opportunistic, with few connections to the armed 
groups they claimed to represent.12 
The RCD, meanwhile, had recruited a large 
political and administrative force to govern the 
areas it occupied, building on existing structures. 
Similar to its military officers, the RCD’s political 
leaders collaborated closely with businesspeople. 
Profiting from the war, these elites obtained 
plots and properties in the big cities. Examples 
are numerous in Goma and Bukavu where they 
built houses and hotels. Due to their political 
and economic weight, political-military elites 
also exercised significant influence on urban 
governance.13
These developments gave the different armed 
mobilizations a strong urban component, even if 
much of the fighting remained concentrated in 
rural areas. Other war-era urban transformations 
resulted from the many people seeking refuge 
in cities and towns, contributing to high urban 
growth rates. This trend has continued after the 
end of the Second Congo War in 2003, particularly 
as violence in many rural areas never stopped
Some of the fighters who demobilized after the 
war moved to cities and towns, whereas others 
sought work in mining zones, which contributed 
to the intensification of urbanization in these 
areas (for example, Rubaya and Nyabibwe in 
North and South Kivu respectively).14 Urbanization 
also occurred in densely populated areas around 
(former) camps for internally displaced persons 
and refugees, such as Kitchanga in North Kivu.15 
These rural-urban transformations helped further 
urbanize the networks of the many armed groups 
that continue to be active today. The latter 
differ in size, structure, objectives, motivations, 
repertoires of mobilization and legitimation.  A 
similar variation characterizes the intensity of their 
connections to urban discourses, dynamics and 
elites.16 
Political mobilization and support
One way in which armed group networks extend 
into cities is via political supporters and big man 
figures of various types.17 Urban-based provincial 
and national politicians and entrepreneurs 
often support armed groups both materially and 
rhetorically. In material terms, they sometimes 
provide covert financial donations or organize 
military supplies.18 Rhetorically, they may publicly 
assert that armed groups defend particular 
communities or, more generally, the country’s 
sovereignty, thereby legitimizing them.19 Influential 
politicians and officials may also act as cover 
(known as parapluie politique, political umbrella) to 
armed group networks, preventing their activities 
from being disrupted and their members from 
being apprehended. 
A telling example of an armed group leader with a 
powerful umbrella is Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, leader 
of Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC). He faced an 
arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity since January 2011, but still managed to 
stand as candidate in the parliamentary elections 
that same year. He remained at large another 
six years, handing himself in—rather than being 
arrested—in July 2017.20 
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There are various reasons why politicians, 
entrepreneurs and officials support armed groups. 
Some are put under pressure by these groups, 
and pay them to avoid harm to themselves, their 
family or property. But many provide support on 
a voluntary basis. One reason is that they agree 
ideologically with these groups’ cause. Another is 
that it allows them to use armed groups for their 
own agenda. Armed groups may, for instance, help 
entrepreneurs secure their business operations 
in rural areas. Furthermore, where they or their 
protégés in rural areas, such as local authorities, are 
in conflict, armed group backing can reinforce their 
position.21 
Supporting armed groups can also earn political 
actors popular support and votes, especially 
where the groups are seen as useful or necessary, 
for instance as they defend certain communities 
against foreign rebels.22 Armed groups may also be 
used to actively interfere in the electoral process. 
During the 2018 elections, a splinter group of the 
Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain 
(APCLS, Alliance of Patriots for a Free and 
Sovereign Congo) under Mapenzi, whose troops 
had occupied polling stations in the Masisi area, 
forced citizens to vote for specific candidates.23 
Some of these candidates had been instrumental 
in helping Mapenzi to split from the core APCLS 
and start a collaboration with the NDC–Rénové 
(a splinter from the NDC under Sheka) earlier in 
2018.24  Furthermore, when electoral commission 
staffers toured rural areas to verify, reshape 
or consolidate electoral districts, they were 
occasionally met with armed resistance.25 
More broadly, political-administrative processes 
often trigger converging interests between armed 
groups and urban-based elites. An example of 
this is the recent elevation of Minembwe in South 
Kivu to a commune rurale (rural commune)—a 
different administrative status. The creation of the 
commune feeds into long-running contestations 
over local authority and territory between the 
Banyamulenge and other groups, who claim 
that the commune is located on and therefore 
amputates their ancestral grounds.26 In conjunction 
with foreign rebel activity, Minembwe’s 
administrative transformation has sparked 
increased armed mobilization in the area, with 
the encouragement of urban-based political actors 
either opposing or defending this development.27 
But armed groups do not only support political 
actors. In the run-up to the 2018 elections, two 
factions of the Nyatura militia in northeast Masisi 
turned against a former governor. Despite long-
standing rumours about the governor being a main 
supporter of these groups, they ambushed him and 
fellow candidates during the electoral campaign in 
December 2018. The delegation narrowly escaped 
being killed. Combatants of these groups justified 
the attack by saying that they suspected the 
governor was collaborating with Rwanda.28 This 
suggests that rather than being mere puppets of 
politicians, armed groups often exercise high levels 
of autonomy.
While it may sometimes be tenuous, politicians’ 
influence over armed groups generally increases 
their status in the national political landscape. It 
shows the government that it needs them to have 
a measure of control over their constituencies. 
To demonstrate their power over armed groups, 
powerful political actors sometimes also encourage 
armed groups to demobilize, and subsequently 
capitalize on their status as peacemakers.29 
Another category of urban-based armed group 
supporters is intellectuals who are part of, and 
sometimes lead, their political branches. The 
character of these political wings differs across 
groups. Some are loosely organized, consisting of 
individuals acting as political representatives on 
an ad hoc basis, without being guided by a formal 
organization, but maintaining direct links with 
armed group leaders. This is the case for certain 
Raia Mutomboki factions in South Kivu. Others 
are highly structured and regulated. An example 
of this latter category is the Mai-Mai Yakutumba 
which has a fully developed political organization, 
the Parti pour l’action et la reconstruction du Congo 
(PARC), with statutes and a political programme 
that sets out its ideology and vision in respect of 
the political, economic, social and administrative 
organization of society.30  
Urban rallying and lobbying on behalf of armed 
groups is sometimes also done among university 
students and by mutualités or ethnic self-help 
associations that provide forms of insurance and 
solidarity to their members, but that have also 
started to act as interest groups.31  These different 
political representatives shape the demands of 
armed groups, as articulated in press releases 
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and communiqués, which are increasingly 
distributed via social media channels. This political 
communication provides updates on battlefield 
activities or political commentary on current 
events such as elections. Recent examples include 
press releases of the Collectif de mouvements pour 
le changement (CMC, Collective of Movements for 
Change), as well as those of the NDC–Rénové (a 
splinter of Sheka’s NDC).
Other examples are the Facebook and Youtube 
campaigns of the Coalition nationale du peuple pour 
la souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC, National Popular 
Coalition for the Sovereignty of the Congo), 
which appear to have been supported by diaspora 
groups,33 Mai-Mai Kilalo statements on the 
illegality of President Kabila remaining in power 
beyond 2016, or the Mai-Mai Kifuafua denouncing 
‘illegal’ defections from their group.34 
Armed groups also frequently issue lists of 
conditions for them to lay down their arms. 
These lists, known as cahiers des charges (demand 
booklets), are usually composed of a mixture of 
high-level political or army positions, demands for 
development projects, and eclectic, often identity-
focused political claims. These demands generally 
reflect how, despite obvious urban influences, 
armed groups remain firmly rooted in rural 
environments. 
Common demands among groups operating 
in isolated areas, such as the former Mai-Mai 
Kapopo in Mwenga and the Mai-Mai Kifuafua 
and Kirikicho on the highlands linking Walikale 
and Kalehe, include improving the road network, 
building schools and hospitals, and promoting the 
development of mining areas.35 Thus, urban-based 
political actors continue to strive to improve their 
rural areas of origin. 
Recruitment and demobilization
Beyond political support, urban environments 
allow for recruitment networks to thrive, targeting 
urban youth and former combatants. To attract 
recruits, most armed groups use narratives of 
ethnicity or indigeneity. These may refer to the 
protection of their community (although the rank-
and-file often come from various ethnic groups), 
or stoking resentment against another one (often 
referred to as ‘foreigners’). Recruitment therefore 
often targets youth from specific groups that tend 
to be concentrated in particular neighbourhoods 
of cities and towns.36 However, testimonies of 
(former) combatants illustrate that recruitment 
rhetoric also draws on other themes, including 
political change, good governance and prospects 
for social mobility. As such, it speaks to universal 
hopes and aspirations.37
The urban youth that join armed groups come from 
different categories. One group is well-educated 
youngsters, many of whom initially grew up in 
rural areas. When they return to their home turf 
as combatants, they are likely to acquire leadership 




Nyatura–John Love group, whose recent command 
includes several university graduates from Goma.38
Another category of urban youth alleged to join 
armed groups are those who want to escape 
personal problems. For instance, they may have 
built up huge debts, are wanted by the police, or 
have obtained a bad reputation as repeat criminal 
offenders, and are therefore at risk of falling victim 
to mob justice.39
It remains unclear what percentage of recruits 
come from urban settings, and this is also likely 
to vary between armed groups.  However, the 
majority appears to be rural youth and those from 
areas with emerging urbanization, such as around 
mining sites and expanding secondary towns. The 
presence of these youths reinforces rural-urban 
links within militarized networks. 
Armed groups’ rural-urban connections do not only 
foster mobilization but also demobilization. Urban-
based relatives, members of mutualités and political 
actors may encourage combatants to lay down their 
arms. These efforts can foster movement in the 
opposite direction, from rural to urban areas. 
Defecting and demobilized combatants, including 
child soldiers, often end up in cities or smaller 
towns, in particular those close to mining 
areas. One reason for this is the shortcomings 
of demobilization programmes, leaving ex-
combatants stranded in cities such as Goma and 
Bukavu without funds to reach their places of 
origin.40
Another reason why former combatants move 
to cities is the fear of reprisals by their former 
commanders for having defected. Others are afraid 
of becoming stigmatized or no longer accepted 
in their home areas, for instance where the 
armed group in which they served has committed 
atrocities, and families of victims remain with 
vengeful feelings.41
Yet other former combatants simply prefer to 
go to larger cities, assuming there are more 
opportunities to make a living. This choice is 
sometimes also informed by the bad organization 
of the reintegration phase of Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
programmes, the funds for which often get 
embezzled.42 Some former combatants who 
demobilized under the third national DDR 
programme (PNDDR3) explained how they chose 
hairdressing as a profession for their life after 
armed group membership, but only received 
broken clippers and other useless utensils. Others 
received wide-meshed fishing nets used for 
catching tilapia, which are unsuitable to fish for the 
much smaller sambaza fishes that their home areas 
are known for.43 
As a result of these difficulties, many who passed 
DDR, as well as those who self-demobilized—
implying they did not participate in any DDR 
programmes —prefer to move to bigger cities, 
especially if they have family networks there. This 
does not necessarily cut them off entirely from 
armed group networks. Urban representatives and 
supporters of armed groups tend to be aware of the 
presence of other members from their community 
and region of origin in towns and cities. Moreover, 
urban dwellers find support and solidarity among 
extended families, or as members of mutualités, and 
are thus not likely to remain anonymous. 
Repertoires of violence 
While many demobilized find new ways to make 
a living in the non-violent urban economy, some, 
including former child soldiers, become involved 
in crime.44 The violent activities of armed groups 
are not limited to clashes with the army or other 
armed forces. These groups engage in a broad 
repertoire of armed revenue-generating activities 
such as ambushes, attacks on houses and shops, 
robberies and kidnappings. Thus, when former 
combatants move to cities and join the urban 
violent labour force, there is a diffusion of 
particular armed practices. The same applies when 
those engaging in urban crime join armed groups 
in rural areas. This diffusion may partly explain 
why urban and rural patterns of violence have 
increasingly come to resemble each other.45
A good example is kidnapping for ransom. First 
becoming prevalent in the Binza groupement 
(administrative entity) of Rutshuru territory in 
2010,46 this practice extended across Rutshuru as 
an ex-Nyatura leader known as Biriko Manoti set 
up more sophisticated networks.47 It also emerged 
in other rural areas, such as the Ruzizi Plain 
around 2014, spearheaded by the armed group 
leader, Bede Rusagara.48 Around 2015, kidnappings 
also started to occur in Goma, and have taken root 
there since, increasingly targeting children.49 
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Economic activities
Armed group networks spanning the rural-urban 
divide also have economic dimensions. For 
instance, armed groups control the production of 
certain commodities, whose supply chain extends 
into urban areas; makala (charcoal) produced in 
Virunga National Park and cannabis are well-
known examples. In some cases, they do not only 
control production, but also other stages of the 
commodity chain, and use violence to maintain 
that control. This ties them firmly to the urban 
context. For instance, parts of the makala trade 
in Goma are controlled by the rebel group Forces 
démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). 
This is cited as a reason for violence being carried 
out against those who work with their money, but 
remain with debts or do not respect the terms of 
the agreement.50
Another way in which militarized economic 
activities link rural and urban areas is that money 
earned by armed group commanders and allied 
entrepreneurs is often invested in cities—mostly 
in real estate. As documented by reports of 
the UN Group of Experts, there are numerous 
entrepreneurs who enriched themselves by doing 
business with armed groups.51 A recent inquiry 
shows that two of these entrepreneurs—cited for 
buying gold from the FDLR in South Kivu—have 
constructed numerous houses in Bukavu. These are 
rented out to UN personnel and international non-
governmental organizations, which tend to pay 
thousands of dollars a month in rent.52  Similarly, 
commanders of the Congolese army, who often 
make money by collaborating with armed groups 
(for instance in the makala trade), have built or 
bought numerous houses in Goma that are often 
rented out to aid workers and UN staffers.53 
Money earned through violent accumulation in 
rural areas also enters the urban economy as it is 
used to buy supplies for armed groups. The groups 
need to purchase arms, ammunition, uniforms, 
boots and means of communication to maintain 
operational capacity. Arms and ammunition are 
often sold from army depots based in cities, such 
as Bukavu.54 Some groups, such as the Burundian 
Forces républicaines du Burundi (FOREBU, Republican 
Forces of Burundi), also buy food supplies in cities, 
in this case Uvira, in addition to rural areas.55 
Urban brokers are instrumental in managing the 
opaque supply chains that get merchandise from 
city to forest. While some have no particular 
political attachments, others are urban elites 
supporting the armed struggle in their places of 
origin. A Goma-based individual providing radios 
to an armed group explained that doing business 
with people originating from the same area is 
more secure given that the complexity of supply 
operations, and the risks involved, require an 
enormous amount of trust.56
Policy considerations
Multiple connections link rural to urban 
environments within contemporary armed 
mobilization in the eastern Congo. These 
connections highlight the need to analyse and 
address armed groups as a networked phenomenon 
that extends across different geographical scales, 
economic sectors and social contexts. Many of 
those involved in these networks are not bush-
based fighters clad in fatigues but rather tie-
wearing politicians and entrepreneurs living in 
cities, or ‘rebels in suits’.57 
For a long time, diplomats and peace-builders 
have neglected the networked nature of armed 
mobilization. They condemn the brutality of rebels 
in the forest while working with rebels in suits—
whether by renting their properties, co-opting 
them in stabilization initiatives or dealing with 
them to obtain licences to operate. A key obstacle 
to disengaging from such interactions is that 
hard evidence of these individuals’ involvement 
in armed group networks is often lacking. For 
example, there are limited consolidated findings 
on real estate investment based on income earned 
through armed activity—yet when walking through 
Goma or Bukavu, many inhabitants can show you 
with precision the houses concerned. 
This lack of evidence points to the need to better 
investigate and document armed group networks. 
While the UN Group of Experts conducts research 
into these issues, their human and financial 
resources are limited, and they face severe 
restrictions on their movement, which hampers 
their work. More importantly, there are numerous 
Congolese organizations and researchers that 
have crucial knowledge of armed group networks. 
Unfortunately, there is little funding available 
to support their work. Developing a mixed 
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Congolese and international Group of Experts 
with a guaranteed budget would be a welcome 
step to address some of the knowledge deficits 
surrounding broader armed group networks. 
Another question is how to address ‘rebels in 
suits’. Should they be placed on international 
sanctions lists; prosecuted; named and shamed; or 
engaged in constructive dialogue? Many of these 
options have drawbacks, and ostracizing people 
can push them more firmly towards armed group 
networks for income and influence. Moreover, 
adequate solutions may differ from case to case. 
Regardless of which paths of action are taken, it 
is vital that the civilian and urban components 
of armed group networks be addressed. Violence 
in the eastern Congo has been ongoing for well 
over two decades and shows little sign of abating. 
A more holistic approach to understanding and 
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